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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate a multidisciplinary model for safety and security 
management (IMMSSM) which can be implemented by means of a suitable Integrated 
Technological System Framework (ITSF) that can be based on Internet of Things 
(IoT)/Internet of Everything (IoE), showing also the significant role played by the integration 
of the elements that compose the model itself, thanks to a proper genetic algorithm studied 
for the specific context. 
Keywords: safety management, security management, Internet of Things, Internet of Everything, 
Genetic Algorithms, IoE/IoT integrated system. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Safety and Security management (SSM) represents a substantial and powerful instrument for 
the prevention of incidental events (fires, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.) and/or 
voluntary attacks (vandalism, thefts, espionage, etc.) against people and tangible and 
intangible resources as well as for their protection when incidental events and/or voluntary 
attacks take place in any sort of organization. 
     It is also essential to mitigate an incidental event (safety) and/or a voluntary attack 
(security) during the initial phase and during the subsequent phases, using fundamentals tools 
represented by emergency management, business/service continuity and disaster recovery.  
     Due to the never-ending growth of new hazards and threats, SSM requires constant 
updating using more and more powerful and flexible tools which must be properly integrated 
via a multidisciplinary method, bearing in mind even financial features which must 
heightened considering a cost/benefit point of view. 
     Integrated technological systems [1]–[5], represent resourceful elements to produce 
answers capable of aiding SSM in a practical way, even from budgets optimization point of 
view. 
     Due to this cause, it is required to exploit a wide-range approach which allows for the 
realization of an integrated multidisciplinary model for safety and security management 
(IMMSSM) [6], which can be implemented by means of a fitting Integrated Technological 
System Framework (ITSF) that can be based on Internet of Things (IoT)/Internet of 
Everything (IoE), considering also the big data aspect. [7], [10]. 
     To realise an effective IMMSSM, it is necessary to enhance the offered tools from the 
cost/benefit point of view. 
     This aim represents an arduous task because of the reduced funds generally available. For 
this reason, it is necessary to use them in a very efficient way, attaining the maximum 
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reduction of risks due to different threats and the best management of residual risks using 
emergency management, service/business continuity and disaster management. 
     From this point of view, a proper genetic algorithm (GA) [11]–[13], has been studied and 
developed and its optimization features within the considered problem are shown, deepening 
results and advantages. 
     The purpose of this paper is to illustrate a multidisciplinary model for safety and security 
management (IMMSSM) and related ITSF, even based on IoT/IoE, showing also the 
significant role played by the integration of the elements that compose the model itself, 
thanks to a proper genetic algorithm studied for the specific context. 
2  THE INTEGRATED MULTIDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR SAFETY  
AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
Since safety and security deal with risks, it is fundamental to provide a general description 
of it for our purposes. Therefore, risk R can be defined as the probability P of a quantifiable 
damage, injury, liability, loss, or any kind of undesired occurrence (briefly designated as 
damage D which depends on the considered situation) that is generated by external or internal 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, the risk R can be defined as: 
 
R = f (P, D),     (1) 
 
where f (*) is a proper function that depends on the considered situation, P represents the 
probability of the risk, variable between 0 and 1, and D represents the damage that can be 
defined according to a selected reference range, as a function of the considered organization. 
We suppose the damage D to be variable between 0 and 10 in the considered context, without 
loss of generality and to preserve a general approach. 
     The proposed integrated multidisciplinary model for safety and security management 
(IMMSSM) joins all the elements necessary to deal with risks such as risk analysis, impact 
analysis, risk mitigation and residual risk management such as emergency management 
(EM), business/service continuity (BSC), and disaster management (DM), considering the 
associated operative tools (OTs), as shown in the following. 
     When a critical event happens despite of all the prevention countermeasures necessary to 
reduce its probability and the protection countermeasures necessary to reduce its damage,  
a plenty of activities must be done to manage the critical event and to return to the initial 
condition, if possible.  
     All the necessary activities can be divided into 3 main phases represented by: 
1. response phase; 
2. recovery phase; 
3. continuity phase; 
according to the kind of actions and activities that are necessary. 
     It is evident that the level of these activities varies according to the considered phase both 
from intensity point of view and from the time duration point of view. 
     The response phase represents the activities that must be done immediately to face the 
critical event, avoiding greater damages. 
     The recovery phase represents the activities that must be done, even overlapped to  
the previous phase, to start to recover from the critical event. 
     The continuity phase represents the activities that must be done, even overlapped to the 
previous phases, to restore the initial condition, before than the critical event. 
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Figure 1:  Activity level as a function of time of the different activities necessary to manage 
a critical event. 
     This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
     Any critical event can provoke a partial or total interruption of the functionality of a given 
organization. Using proper prevention and protection countermeasures and proper activities 
to manage the residual risk, illustrated in the following, it is possible to reduce the 
interruption time. It is evident that if a short interruption time is necessary, due to the needs 
of the considered organization, a noticeable investment is necessary to set up all the necessary 
countermeasures. The recovery cost decreases with the tolerable interruption time since less 
efforts are needed. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Costs as a function of interruption time. 
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     On the other side, the interruption cost increases with the time, according to a behaviour 
that depends of the specific organization. The crossing point between the recovery cost curve 
and the interruption cost curve allows to individuate the break-even point that represents the 
balance point between the cost necessary to recover the situation and the cost due to  
the interruption, giving also the optimal interruption time and the optimal investment 
necessary. 
     Operative tools are represented by all the elements that can be used for SSM, properly 
integrated and supported from a ITSF. They can be divided into countermeasures (CM)  
[1]–[5], [14], security and safety policies and procedures (PR), and human factor and 
resources (HF). Countermeasures are represented by physical/logical technology (physical: 
intrusion detection, access control, video surveillance, fire detection, dangerous gas detection 
etc.; logical: intrusion detection systems, anti-viruses, etc) and physical/logical barriers 
(physical: fences, armoured doors, armoured glasses, fire extinguisher etc.; logical: firewalls, 
etc.). Human factors and resources is fundamental to obtain the best performance by 
personnel and people, training them and using a proper psychodynamic/epigenetic – 
evaluation/improving [15]. It is also very important to evaluate human error for an efficient 
SSM using the most proper method such as ASEP (Accident Sequence Evaluation Program), 
HEART (Human Error Assessment Reduction Technique), APJ (Absolute Probability 
Judgment), ATHEANA (A Technique for Human Event Analysis), HRMS (Human 
Reliability Management System), JHEDI (Justified Human Error Data Information) etc. 
according to the considered situation [16]. 
     Risk analysis [17]–[21] is a fundamental tool to evaluate the threats regarding an 
organization and it can be divided into distinct groups, represented by: qualitative, semi-
quantitative, quantitative, and mixed including human factor. 
     Qualitative risk analysis is useful in doing a general and preliminary overview of the 
threats of an organization but it does not provide quantitative results that are fundamental to 
do the correct choices. Anyway, it represents a valid method to synthetize the risk scenario 
to be illustrated even to not skilled people. The main techniques for qualitative risk analysis 
are represented by: vulnerability array, interaction array, V2 array, threats array, FMEA 
(Failure Mode Event Analysis), etc. 
     Quantitative risk analysis is fundamental in giving the exact values of different threats. It 
can be a very complex and expensive process, due to the elevated number of activities which 
are necessary to do it in an effective way. The main techniques for quantitative risk analysis 
are represented by: ETA (Event Tree Analysis), FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), etc. 
     Semi-quantitative risk analysis represents an intermediate analysis positioned between 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. It tries to reach a good trade-off between both of them. 
A commonly used method of this group is represented by AZHOP (HAZard and Operability 
analysis) but there are plenty of others. 
     Mixed risk analysis including human factor joins different techniques. The most 
commonly used methods are represented by LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) but there 
are plenty of others. 
     Once individuated and quantified all the risks of the considered organization, it is 
necessary to evaluate the impact that those risks can produce over the organization itself, 
identifying all the fundamental elements that must be kept operative to guarantee that the 
organization could work. From this point of view, it is important to consider three important 
parameters represented by: MTD (Maximum Tolerable Downtime), RTO (Recovery Time 
Objective), RPO (Recovery Point Objective) that provide a quantitative evaluation regarding 
the above elements which is necessary to perform a correct impact analysis. 
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     Risk mitigation is done using all the necessary OTs to reduce the probability of each risk 
(prevention activities) and/or damage of each risk (protection activities). There are four main 
strategies for risk mitigation, represented by: risk acceptance (the risk is accepted since the 
mitigation activity is too expensive with respect to the damage produced by the risk), risk 
avoidance (any risk is reduced at the minimum level without any care to of costs),  
risk limitation (that is the most common strategy since it reduces the exposition considering 
only a sub-set of actions. It joins risk acceptance and risk avoidance), risk transference  
(the risk is transferred to third parties available at accepting it). 
     Residual risk management can be made using emergency management, service/business 
continuity and disaster management that can and must be strongly integrated to avoid 
malfunctioning of residual risk management. 
     Emergency management is extremely important to manage critical situations according to 
what is planned in the safety and security procedures and policies, using OTs in a suitable 
way. In fact, it is important to operate in a very efficient and precise way as soon as the 
emergency happens otherwise it could be no more possible to recover the initial conditions 
and the consequences could be more dangerous. 
     Business and service continuity focus about what is necessary to recover between 
functionalities, processes and activities which are considered critical for the correct 
operativity of the considered organization. They can be divided into the typical phases of 
plan, do, check, improve. 
     Disaster recovery is represented by the technological, management and logistic elements 
necessary to recover the operativity of an organization, focusing mainly of system, data, 
infrastructure even if this represent a quite limited approach since disaster can be caused from 
a plenty of reasons. 
     It is evident, from what illustrated above, that not only the above elements of residual risk 
management must be strongly linked but also all the elements of SSM, including OTs, must 
be linked together to obtain performing and efficient results. For this reason, a suitable 
integrated multidisciplinary model for safety and security management (IMMSSM) has been 
studied [6], representing a general model valuable for most organizations that, in the present 
paper, is furtherly studied and deepened. The scheme of IMMSSM is shown in Fig. 3. 
     An appropriate Integrated Technological System Framework (ITSF), aided by a proper 
optimization procedure for the use of OTs from the cost/benefit point of view, can reduce the 
general risk of the organization at minimum cost, as shown below, thus assuring the finest 
employment of the IMMSSM at lowest rate with respect to the wanted objectives. 
     All the elements of the IMMSSM showed above interrelate reciprocally: if there  
is a variation in one of them, such as a new threat to face, the related variation of risk analysis 
generates an unavoidable adjustment in all the other elements, since the model is strictly 
correlated. 
     Other fundamental elements that must be considered for OTs, emergency management, 
business /service continuity and disaster recovery, are represented by reliability and 
resilience, as illustrated in Fig. 3. 
     The IMMSSM needs of an Integrated Technological System Framework (ITSF) for its 
sustenance and for the actuation of all the strategies and procedures, due to the assortment of 
features, analyses and measures which must be considered in normal and critical 
circumstances. 
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Figure 3:  Scheme of the Integrated Multidisciplinary Model for Safety and Security 
Management (IMMSSM). (Source: Sostituire figura.)
     The IMMSSM and the related supporting ITSF must consider also analysis, planning and 
management of the maintenance and quality, as well as the initial realization cost and annual 
cost. 
     To create a performing IMMSSM, it is required to improve the use of OTs 
from a cost/benefit point of view, as shown in the following, considering not only the cost of 
initial execution but also the annual costs. 
     From this point of view, the great advantages deriving by the integrability of OTs in the 
above IMMSSM and related ITSF are demonstrated in the following. 
3  THE INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM FRAMEWORK 
To support the IMMSSM, it is strongly recommended the use of a fitting Integrated 
Technological System Framework based on Internet of Everything (IoE-ITSF). In this way, 
it is possible to warrant all the objects of the IMMSSM in a flexible and modular way, to 
translate, at any time, any necessary tuning of the IMMSSM into a rapid and cheap 
modification of the correlated IoE-ITSF. 
     This target can be achieved by means of integrated systems [1]–[5] and advanced 
technologies such as Internet of Everything (IoE) where people, things (mobile terminals, 
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Figure 4:  Scheme of the Integrated Technological System Framework based on Internet of 
Everything (IoE-ITSF) to support the Integrated Multidisciplinary Model for 
Safety and Security Management (IMMSSM). 
devices, actuators, smart sensors, wearable devices, etc.), data/information/knowledge and 
procedures are properly connected to attain the required targets [7]–[10]. The general scheme 
of the proposed IoE-ITSF is shown in Fig. 4. 
     The IoE-ITSF is characterized by a high modularity which allows for the integration, at 
any time and in flexible way, of any sort of component which requests to be unified in the 
IoE system. 
     The proposed IoE-ITSF is planned to be a widespread framework useful for the most 
organizations where can be external visitor’s. For this reason, the networks used to provide 
supervision, control and safety/security services, internal personnel services and visitor’s 
services are suitably separated from the physical and logical points of view for security reason 
[14]. 
     The IoE-ITSF can interconnect all the “IoE objects”, providing a proper signalling to the 
operators (personnel in the control room, security personnel, safety personnel, maintenance 
personnel, Police, Fire Brigades, Civil Protection, Medical staff, etc.), in real time, via any 
type of communication means, when any unsafe or risky situation takes place. [14]. 
     It is evident that IoE-ITSF deals with a huge amount of data and, for this reason, it uses 
proper big data and data analytics techniques to ensure always its best performances [8]. 
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4  IMPROVING FEATURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
To set up an efficient IMMSSM, suitable for a given organization, it is essential to select and 
integrate the available operative tools (OTs), considering their improving features, such as 
integrability, which is the scope of the paper. 
     Generally, due to the funds availability limitation, this goal can be difficult to be realised 
in the most of contexts. For this reason, it is essential the use of funds in an efficient way so 
that can be achieved the maximum reduction of damages depending on different threats and 
the best management of residual risks by means of emergency management, service/business 
continuity and disaster management. 
     The considered problem is typically nonlinear, multi-parameters and multi-goals and has 
already been resolved by means Genetic Algorithms (GAs) [11]–[13], without considering 
improving features of OTs, such as integrability. In the following, after briefly illustrating 
the general optimization method, due to the limited space available, the improving feature of 
integrability of OTs are studied and the related results are illustrated. 
     The already studied Genetic Algorithms (GAs) [6], has demonstrated to be able of 
optimizing the use of the operative tools (OTs) available and allows to set up a resourceful 
IMMSSM for the considered context characterized by an optimal cost/benefit ratio. 
     Once individuated and evaluated all the threats by means of risk analysis, and all the 
available OTs, together with the relative realization cost and annual maintenance costs  
(to contemplate their total cost of the useful life cycle), the GA can find the best mixture of 
OTs, using only the available ones, which can be used to guarantee the maximum reduction 
of total risk, respecting the available budget [6]. 
     The process starts with a preliminary and detailed analysis which permits to generate  
a group of arrays which contain all the information necessary for the GA to run its 
optimization duty [6]. The arrays are represented by RA (Risks Array), P (Probability Array), 
D (Damage Array), CM (Countermeasures Array), Procedures Array (PR), Human Factor 
Array (HF), EM (Emergency Management Array), BSC (Business and Service Continuity), 
DR. 
     A suitable fitness function leads the evolution of the individuals of the GA to reach the 
ultimate whished optimization target. Due to the limited space available, the GA is not 
illustrated in the following. Anyway, the GA has been tested on more than 800 real and 
random situations, to get general mean results which can be applicable in any type of context. 
All the results are got with quite quick converge. Due to the limited space available, only the 
remarkable results are showed in the following. 
     A substantial parameter in this type of problem is represented by the mean OT flexibility 
MOTflexibility, represented by the mean value, extended over all the OTs, of the number of 
risks of the P, D, EM, BSC, DR arrays where each OT is used, and the total number of risks 
of the same arrays. The MOTflexibility synthetizes the mean flexibility of OTs and can vary 
between 1 (all OTs can be used for any activities) and 0 (not any OT can be used for any 
activities, that is a not real situation). For example, CCTV represents a very flexible OT since 
it can be applied both to reduce the probability and the damage of a given risk but can be also 
be advantageous for emergency management, business and service continuity and for disaster 
recovery. Further, CCTV is characterized by a great integrability, that represents the 
improving factor which is desired to be studied in the following. It is clear that, the greater 
MOTflexibility and the greater the GA possibility of optimization, as will be shown in the 
following. 
     An additional and significant parameter is represented by the investment ratio IR, which 
is the ratio between the investment cost, represented by the sum of the realization cost and 
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the annual cost, and the total cost of OTs. The IR can therefore vary between 1 (all OTs are 
used for any activity since the investment permits it) and 0 (not any OT can be used for any 
activity, since the investment does not permit it, which is an unreal situation). It is clear that 
the greater IR and the greater the GA possibility of optimization, as will be shown in the 
following. 
     In this part, the contribute of integrability of OTs is not considered, to study properly its 
efficient role in the following, demonstrating all its improving features. 
     It is also evident that if all the possible OTs (without considering their integrability which 
is the goal of this study and whose role is studied later) are used, the total risk, characterised 
by the sum of all considered risks, is reduced at the initially minimum planned level (that is 
a reduction value equal to 100%) while if not any OT is used, the total risk remains at the 
initially maximum planned level (that is a reduction value equal to 0%). The total risk 
reduction (RR) represents an appropriate parameter to quantify the optimization skills of the 
GA. 
     The total risk reduction RR, expressed in percentage form, as a function of investment 
ratio IR, for different values of MOTflexibility., is shown in Fig. 5. 
     Fig.5 shows how the GA can efficiently reduce the RR as a function of both IR and 
MOTflexibility, as estimated [6]. If IR increases, more OTs can be used by GA for risk reduction, 
and the curves grow, according to different profiles, as a function of MOTflexibility. 
     The greater the MOTflexibility and the greater the possibility of GA to perform its 
optimization tasks. If MOTflexibility tends to 1 (maximum value reachable), the OTs can be 
used in most activities and this allows the GA to perform its maximum optimization tasks, 
achieving a total risk reduction of 100% with investment ratio equal to about 0.4. If 
MOTflexibility tends to 0 (minimum theoretical reachable value), the OTs cannot be used in 
most activities and this does not permit the GA to best perform its optimization abilities, 
achieving a total risk reduction of 100% with investment ratio IR equal to about 0.9. Even in 
this worst case, anyway, the GA can ensure a decrease of IR. In Fig. 5, it is not considered 
the situation MOTflexibility = 0 since this situation is unreal. For this reason, only the situation 
when MOTflexibility = 0.001 is considered, as lower values of MOTflexibility tend to produce 
curves that are practically superimposed to this last curve. 
     From the results of the previous research illustrated synthetically above, it is evident that 
the more the MOTflexibility is close to one and the more the final solution is characterized  
by a final solution which is extremely efficient from the cost/benefit point of view [6]. 
     It is now important to investigate the role of improving features of OTs, such as 
integrability, to verify if and how it is capable of contributing in an efficient way, under all 
the points of view, to the safety and security management, which represents the scope of the 
paper. 
     As demonstrated in the following, the percentage of OTs that can be integrated into the 
IoE system (OTI) can increase the MOTflexibility, optimizing the cost/benefit ratio of the final 
solutions for safety and security management. 
     A substantial parameter to validate the effect of OTI is represented by the MOTflexibility, 
since it greatly impacts the GA ability of attaining the desired target in an effective way, as 
shown in Fig. 5. 
     To verify the improving features of OTI, the above GA simulations were repeated, varying 
OTI from 0 (none OTs can be integrated within the system) to 100% (all the OTs can be 
integrated in the system) and the MOTflexibility has been calculated as a function of OTI 
(expressed in percentage). In Fig. 6, the MOTflexibility as a function of the percentage of OTs 
that can be integrated into the IoE system (OTI), for different values of initial MOTflexibility 
(0.001, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8) is shown. 
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Figure 5:  Total risk reduction (%) as a function of number of investment ratio IR for different 
values of MOTflexibility. 
     As it is possible to see from Fig.6, the increase of the percentage of OTs that can be 
integrated into the IoE system (OTI) increases the MOTflexibility, for any kind of initial value 
of MOTflexibility. 
    Since the RR illustrated in Fig. 5 has been considered for 4 significant values of 
MOTflexibility (0.001, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8), the same was made in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Figure 6:  MOTflexibility as a function of the percentage of OTs that can be integrated into the 
IoE system (OTI), for different values of initial MOTflexibility (0.001, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 
0.8). 
294  Safety and Security Engineering VII
 
 www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 
WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 174, © 2018 WIT Press
     Results shown in Fig. 6 reveal that when the percentage of integrated OTs is null (OTI=0 
%) the MOTflexibility remains obviously the same for the 4 considered initial values (0.001, 
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8). As soon as the percentage of integrated OTs increases, due to increase of 
their performances depending on the mutual interaction, the MOTflexibility augments  
in a substantial way for lower initial values of the MOTflexibility itself (0.001) and in a less 
significant way for greater initial values of the MOTflexibility itself (0.8). 
     When all OTs are fully integrated (OTI=100%) the MOTflexibility reaches the maximum 
level for the 4 considered initial values (0.001, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8). In particular, for greater 
initial values of MOTflexibility, it is possible to reach a final value of MOTflexibility close to 1 
(maximum level of flexibility of OTs which permits to achieve the minimum level of risk 
with the lowest possible cost) even with a quite reduce value of OTI. 
     Anyway, it is possible to see that the MOTflexibility increases in a more significant way for 
lower initial values of itself, showing the importance of integration of OT into the IoE system. 
     The above quantitative results demonstrate how the percentage of OTs that are integrated 
into the IoE system represents a vital need to create an efficient IMMSSM from the 
cost/benefit point of view. 
5  CONCLUSIONS 
A multidisciplinary model for safety and security management and the related integrated 
technological system framework based on IoT/IoE has been illustrated, studying also the 
significant role played by the integration of the elements (operative tools or OTs) that 
compose the model itself, thanks to a proper genetic algorithm studied for the specific 
context. 
     The quantitative results that have been attained demonstrate the valuable importance of 
integration of the operative tools of the model that can be properly achieved thanks to 
integrated technological systems based on IoT/IoE. 
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